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We study the effects of product differentiation in a Stackelberg model with demand 
uncertainty for the first mover. We do an ex-ante and ex-post analysis of the profits 
of the leader and of the follower firms in terms of product differentiation and of the 
demand uncertainty. We show that even with small uncertainty about the demand, 
the follower firm can achieve greater profits than the leader, if their products are 
sufficiently differentiated. We also compute the probability of the second firm 
having higher profit than the leading firm, subsequently showing the advantages 
and disadvantages of being either the leader or the follower firm. 
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1. Introduction 
The Stackelberg model [1] is one of the most widely used models in industrial organization 
to analyse the behaviour of the firms in a competitive environment. It models the strategic 
situation where firms sequentially choose their output levels in a market. The belief of first- 
mover advantage was widely held among entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, but is now 
questioned by numerous practitioners. There are examples of successful and unsuccessful 
pioneering firms as described, for instance, in Liu [2]: Dell was the first to introduce the 
direct-sale business model into the PC market, and it achieved great success; however, 
during the dot-com booming era, Pets.com, Webvan.com, Garden.com and eToys.com were 
all unsuccessful first movers in their respective market segments. The probability of success 
of pioneering in a market clearly depends on many factors, including technology, marketing 
strategy, market demand and product differentiation (see [1–18]). Liu [2] studied the effect 
of uncertainty in demand systems where only the leading firm is facing uncertainty in the 
demand parameter α that is considered to be uniformly distributed on an interval α0, α1 . 
In this paper, we add the dimension of product differentiation to Liu’s model and we show 
among other results that if their products are sufficiently differentiated, even with small 
uncertainty about the demand, the follower can achieve higher profits than the leader. 
Our  study  focus  on  the  influence  of  two  parameters:  the  product  differentiation 
0  < γ  ≤  1 and demand uncertainty θ  ≥  1. When γ    is close to one we have small 
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differentiation between the goods and when γ is small we have high differentiation between 
the goods. The demand uncertainty θ   α1/α0 can be interpreted as the maximum value  
of demand using the minimum value of demand α0 as the unit. In Theorem 1, we prove the 
existence of a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium that requires a different reasoning from 
Liu’s [2]. In Corollary 1, we compare the quantities produced by each firm and prove the 
existence of a threshold T for α, depending upon θ and γ , such that, bellow that threshold 
the leader is producing more than the follower and above that threshold the follower is 
producing more than the leader. In Theorem 2, we present the (ex-ante) expected profits of 
the two firms, depending upon the parameters θ and γ and we characterize two parameter 
regions A1 and A2 in the parameter space (γ , θ) with the following properties: in the region 
A1 the ex-ante profits of firm F1 are higher than ex-ante profits of firm F2; in the region  
A2 the ex-ante profits of firm F2 are higher than ex-ante profits of firm F1. In Theorem 3, 
we prove the existence of a threshold θ0 for the demand uncertainty parameter θ , such that 
for θ greater than θ0 the expected profit of the follower is always (i.e. for any γ ) greater 
than the expected profit of the leader. In Theorem 4, we find the (ex-post) profits of the 
firms and we characterize three parameter regions P1, P2  and  P3  in the parameter space 
(γ , θ) corresponding to three distinct economic behaviours: a region P1, where the leading 
firm always has a higher profit than the follower firm; a region P2, where there exists R, 
depending upon γ and θ , with the property that (i) if α<  R, the leading firm has a higher 
profit than the follower firm, and (ii) if α > R, the follower firm has a higher profit than 
the leading firm; autoedited1. a region  P3, where there exists L, depending upon γ and   
θ , with the property that (i) if L < α < R, the leading firm has a higher profit than the 
follower firm, and (ii) if α < L or α > R, the follower firm has a higher profit than the 
leading firm. Hence, we show that the leading firm looses its advantage for high values  
of the demand intercept α, if the demand uncertainty parameter θ belongs to the union of 
regions P2 and P3. Furthermore, the leading firm also looses its advantage for low values 
of the demand intercept α, if the demand uncertainty parameter θ   belongs to the region 
P3. Furthermore, in Corollary 2, we compute the ex-ante probability P(π2
∗ > π1
∗) that the 
follower’s ex-post profit is higher than the leader’s ex-post profit. ex-ante expected profits 
and the ex-post profits of the leader firm and of the follower firm, and we also compute 
the probability P(π2
∗ > π1
∗) of the second firm having higher profit than the leading firm. 
We show that this probability increases both with the demand uncertainty and the degree of 
differentiation of the goods. 
 
2. The model and the perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
We start by describing the Stackelberg duopoly with product differentiation. We consider 
two firms, each producing a differentiated good. The demand, for simplicity, is linear 
  
 
 
with α > 0 and 0 < γ    1, where  pi  is the price and qi  the amount of good produced 
by the firm  Fi , for i       1, 2 . We  note that the two products are substitutes and, since    
γ 1, ‘cross effects’ are dominated by ‘own effects’. The value of γ expresses the degree 
of product differentiation. When γ is equal to one, the goods are homogeneous, and when 
γ tends to zero, we are close to independent goods (see [18]). We assume that the firms 
have the same constant marginal cost c. From now on, we consider prices net of marginal 
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costs. This is without any loss of generality because if the marginal cost is positive, we may 
replace α by α c. We consider that the demand intercept is a random variable uniformly 
distributed in the interval α0, α1 , with α1 > α0 > 0. We note that, in this case, the demand 
uncertainty parameter θ is equal to the ratio α1/α0 (can be interpreted as the maximum 
value of demand using the minimum value of demand α0 as the unit). The distribution of α 
is common knowledge. Profit πi of firm Fi  is given by 
  
As already stated in the Introduction, the timing of the game is as follows: 
(i) Firm F1 chooses a quantity level q1 0 without knowing the value of the demand 
realization; 
(ii) Firm F2 first observes the demand realization and observes q1, and then chooses a 
quantity level q2 ≥ 0. 
In the next theorem, we show that this game has a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
(q1
∗, q2
∗) and we give its explicit characterization. Let 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theorem  1    Consider a differentiated products Stackelberg duopoly facing the demand 
system (1), where the parameter α is uniformly distributed in the interval α0, α1 . Then, 
there is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium (q1
∗, q2
∗) given as follows: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
    
 
 
Theorem 1 is proved in the Appendix. From this theorem, we conclude that when the 
interval of α is large and the products are not very differentiated (large γ ), if the realized 
demand is small the follower may choose not to produce at all. The relevant parameters  
in terms of their economical effects are γ and θ . In the next corollary, we compare the 
quantities produced by each firm. 
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Figure 1. The quantities produced by each firm when the intervals of the uniform distribution of the 
parameter α are such that the ratio θ between its endpoints is as in each situation of Corollary 1, for 
γ = 0.8, α0 = 1 and (a) α1 = 1.5; (b) α1 = 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corollary 1 is proved in the Appendix. The three different situations described in this 
corollary are illustrated for some values of the parameters in Figure 1. We observe the 
existence of a threshold R for α such that for values of α smaller than that threshold the 
leader is producing more, and for values of α greater than that threshold the follower is 
producing more. This is due to the fact that the leader makes the decision based only on 
expectations. The follower is going to produce more if the demand turns out to be large 
(and possibly more than the leader), and less if the realized demand is small (and possibly 
less than the leader). 
 
3. Ex-ante expected profits 
In this section, we present an ex-ante analysis of the Stackelberg game previously described. 
In the next theorem, we explicitly show the profits that the firms can expect, before the 
knowledge of the demand realization α. For simplicity of notation, we denote by πi
∗  the 
profit πi   q1
∗, q2
∗(q1
∗, α) , for i ∈ {1, 2}. Let γ0 : [3, +∞) → R0
+ 
be defined by 
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Theorem  3  There is θ0   7.30 such that if the uncertainty parameter θ is greater than 
θ0, then the expected profit of the follower firm is always greater than the expected profit of 
the leading firm. 
 
Theorem 3 is proved in the Appendix. 
In Figure 3, we plot the firms’ expected profits, E (π1
∗) and E (π2
∗), as functions of the 
demand uncertainty parameter θ and of the degree γ of product differentiation. Figure  4 
illustrates cross-sections of Figure 3 at the degrees γ 0.9 (Figure 4(a)) and γ  0.5  
(Figure 4(b)) of product differentiation. Figure 5 illustrates cross-sections of Figure 3 at the 
demand uncertainty parameter’s values θ = 2 (Figure 5(a)) and θ = 8 (Figure 5(b)). 
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Figure 2. Plot of C(θ, γ ). 
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Figure 3. Firms’ expected profits varying with the demand uncertainty parameter θ and with the 
degree γ of the product differentiation, by taking α0 = 1. 
These figures illustrate that both parameters θ and γ are relevant to determine which 
firm has ex-ante higher expected profits. 
 
4. Ex-post profits 
In this section, we present the ex-post analysis of the same Stackelberg game. In Theorem 4, 
we explicitly present the ex-post profits π1
∗ and π2
∗ of firms 1 and 2, respectively, obtained 
after the observation of the demand realization. We describe three regions for the demand 
uncertainty parameter θ α1/α0 corresponding to three distinct profits relations between 
the leading and the follower firms (see Figure 6). The low-medium uncertainty boundary 
value is 
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Figure  4.  Cross-sections of  Figure 3  at  the  degrees (a) γ 0.9 and (b) γ 0.5 of product 
differentiation. 
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Figure 5.  Cross-sections of Figure 3 at the uncertainty parameter’s values (a) θ = 2 and (b) θ = 8. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Three regions for the demand uncertainty parameter θ corresponding to three distinct 
profits relations between the leading and the follower firms. 
 
 
 
 
and the medium–high uncertainty boundary value is 
 
 
 
 
 
E( 
* 
) 
2 
 
 
E(
* 
) 
1 
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
 p
ro
fi
ts
 
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
 p
ro
fi
ts
 
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
 p
ro
fi
ts
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
0 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
          
 
 P
1
 
I


J 
E(
*
)=E(
*
) 

1 2 
P
2
 
P
3
 
= 
= ≤ 
= 
Figure 7). 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
1 3 5 7 
 = 
1
/
0
 
Figure 7.  Plots of the functions Iγ and Jγ , and the regions P1, P2 and P3. 
Let P1 = {(θ , γ ) : θ < Iγ }, P2 = {(θ , γ ) : Iγ ≤ θ ≤ Jγ } and P3 = {(θ , γ ) : θ > Jγ } (see 
The functions Iγ and Jγ characterize the demand uncertainty parameter θ for which the 
leading firm looses its advantage for some realizations of the demand random variable. In 
fact, in the next theorem, we will show that the leading firm looses its advantage for high 
values of the demand intercept, if the demand uncertainty parameter θ is greater than Iγ , 
and also for low values of the demand intercept, if the demand uncertainty parameter θ is 
greater than Jγ . Hence, for high values of the demand uncertainty parameter (θ > Jγ ) only 
in an intermediate zone of the realized demand does the first mover preserve its advantage. 
We observe that for homogeneous goods (γ    1), the functions Iγ and  Jγ coincide, i.e.  
I1       J1  (Liu’s case [2]), and for non-homogeneous goods (0      γ  < 1), we have    that 
Iγ < Jγ . Observe that the curve given by E (π1
∗) E (π2
∗) crosses the curves P1 and P2 
(see Figure 7). 
We define L and R as follows: 
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Figure 8.  The profits of both firms when the intervals of the uniform distribution of the parameter  
α are such that the ratio θ between its endpoints is as in each situation of Theorem 4, for γ = 0.8, 
α0 = 1 and (a) α1 = 1.5; (b) α1 = 2.5; (c) α1 = 4. 
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Figure 9.  Plots of the functions (a) R(α0,γ, α1); and (b) L(α0,γ, α1), by considering α0 = 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theorem 4 is proved in the Appendix. This theorem allows us to say that even with small 
uncertainty about the demand, the follower can achieve greater profits than the leader, if their 
products are sufficiently differentiated (Figure 8). In Figure 9, we present the plots of R and 
L as functions of the demand uncertainty parameter θ and of the degree of differentiation 
γ . In Figure 10, we show the plots of  R  and  L  as functions of the demand  uncertainty 
parameter θ , for some chosen values of the degree γ of differentiation. We take α0 = 1 
and, so, we observe that α1 = θ . We note that the values L and R are increasing with θ . 
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Figure 10. Plots of the functions R(α0,γ, α1) and L(α0,γ, α1), by considering α0 = 1 and in the 
cases of (a) γ = 1; and (b) γ = 0.9. 
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Figure 11. The probability of the second firm having higher profit than the leading firm, as a function 
of the demand uncertainty parameter θ , for different degrees γ of the differentiation of the goods, by 
taking α0 = 1. 
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Figure 12. Solid line refers to the equality between the probabilities of the second firm having higher 
profit than the leading firm and the dashed line refers to the equality between the expected profits of 
both firms. 
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Appendix 
In this Appendix, we prove of the results presented throughout the paper. 
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